Three things this report's own research surfaced that a simple reading of "which companies serve data centres" would miss entirely. This is where this report's own original synthesis, rather than a repackaging of public data, actually lives.
Several companies in this report are large, diversified businesses for which data-centre work is real but financially immaterial. L&T's own data-centre business, branded L&T-Vyoma and being transferred into a new subsidiary for ₹1,400 crore, generated roughly ₹36.6 crore of FY26 revenue against L&T's own ₹2,85,874 crore of consolidated group revenue — on the order of one-hundredth of one percent. Siemens Ltd's own data-centre-adjacent automation and building-electrification work sits inside a much larger industrial-automation and mobility business. Kalpataru Projects International lists "data centres" as a served sector on its own website, yet this report's research could not find a single named data-centre construction contract behind that listing. None of this means these are bad businesses — it means a reader should not mistake "this company appears in a data-centre-sector report" for "this company's stock is a data-centre bet," and each individual company report in this document states this distinction explicitly wherever it applies.
The single most concentrated, best-quantified data-centre revenue exposure this report's research found anywhere belongs to Sterlite Technologies — data centres reportedly grew from roughly 1% to 21% of the company's quarterly revenue within a year, backed by a named, multi-year, billion-dollar-scale contract. A reader working from the intuitive assumption that "power equipment is where the real data-centre exposure lives" would miss this entirely. This report's own company file on Sterlite Technologies pairs that finding with an equally important caveat — a genuinely unreconciled, three-way conflict in the company's own disclosed quarterly profit figures — because a concentrated revenue story sitting on top of unreliable earnings data is not the same thing as a clean investment case, and this report treats the two facts with equal weight rather than letting the exciting one crowd out the cautionary one.
JLL's own India research found pre-committed hyperscale capacity made up 82% of total data-centre space absorbed in H1 2026 (§6) — meaning most new capacity changing hands today is contractually locked in years before it is commissioned and counted as "operational" in any published megawatt figure. Every headline "India data-centre capacity, MW" number is, by construction, a lagging count of what has already been switched on; it understates near-term demand for the transformers, switchgear and cooling plants this report's companies actually sell, because that demand is committed well ahead of the MW figure catching up — the same structural undercount this report's sister volume found on the compute side.
Every company report that follows should be read against this backdrop: a company's inclusion in this report is a statement about sector relevance, not investment materiality — each company's own report states plainly where on that spectrum it actually sits, from Sterlite Technologies' concentrated-but-unreliable 21% revenue exposure to L&T's real-but-negligible one-hundredth-of-one-percent.
